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Introduction
Many models of timing with irreversible decisions involve informational is-
sues. In patent races, the level of scientiﬁc knowledge within a ﬁrm evolves
randomly, and is unknown to its competitors until a patent has been ﬁled.
Nevertheless, competitors can infer some information on this level by ob-
serving whether the other ﬁrm is still pursuing the new venue. As another
illustration, entry/exit decisions are based on available information, e.g., on
the demand function, which is of a private nature in many relevant cases.
In the present paper we study a model of strategic learning with endoge-
nous timing, in which private information accumulates through time, and
actions are publicly observed.
The game we analyze is based upon two-armed bandits. One arm is
known, and yields a constant payoﬀ (which we normalize to 0). The other
arm is unknown, and can be either High or Low. Whatever be its type, the
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1unknown arm outputs an i.i.d. sequence of payoﬀs; the expected payoﬀ is
positive if the type is High, and negative if it is Low.
The players operate replica two-arm bandits with all risky arms having
the same type (either all High, or all Low). Each player has to decide when
to switch from the risky arm to the safe arm. Switching back from the safe
to the risky arm is assumed to be too costly, so that in eﬀect the decision to
switch to the safe arm is irreversible. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.8) discuss
the irreversibility of decisions in the context of investment. We refer to the
switching decision as “dropping out of the game”. The goal of each player is
to maximize the discounted sum of her stage payoﬀs.
A distinctive feature of our model lies in the information structure. Pay-
oﬀs are privately observed, while all exit decisions are public information.
Equivalently, each player knows who dropped out in the past, and when.
The game is a game of pure informational externalities. The payoﬀ to a
player depends only on her decisions and on the type of her machine, and
not on other players’ decisions. However, since the type of the machine is
common, payoﬀs – and hence private informations – are correlated. Thus,
player j’s behavior may contain valuable information on the common type.
This informational externality is the only source of interaction among players.
We now outline our main results. After proving the existence of a sym-
metric equilibrium, we study qualitative properties of the equilibria. Our
ﬁrst result relates to the nature of equilibrium strategies. It is shown that
all equilibria are pure, and moreover they are in cut-oﬀ strategies. That is,
the inﬂow of (private and public) information is processed in the following
simple way. At each stage, each player computes the conditional probability
that the type of her machine is High, computed on the basis of her private
information; this quantity is called the player’s private belief, because it does
not take into account public information given by the other players’ actions.
She then compares her private belief to a (time-dependent) cut-oﬀ. When-
ever the news that someone dropped out is received, the player adapts by
changing the cut-oﬀs. Note that these equilibrium strategies are monotonic,
in the sense that, everything else being equal, a player’s decision is monotonic
w.r.t. her private belief.
We then further investigate the equilibrium cut-oﬀs. Such results are eas-
ier to state for two-player games. It turns out that the longer the other player
is active the more optimistically a player behaves : it requires worse private
beliefs to induce her switching to the safe arm. Indeed, casual intuition sug-
2gests that, the longer a player stays in, the better news it is for the other
player. Therefore, the equilibrium cut-oﬀs should be decreasing. While the
conclusion indeed holds (at least for two players), the analysis is intricate.
The reason is as follows. Consider the equilibrium cut-oﬀs of player i, when
player j is still active. These are computed by taking into account the belief
over the common type, but also the option value of waiting. For a given
value of her private belief, player i will indeed be more optimistic at stage
n+1 than at stage n. The option value involves the information that player
i will later derive from her private payoﬀs and public decisions of player j.
If say, player i ﬁnds it likely that player j will either drop out very soon or
very late depending on her payoﬀs, she may wish to stay in few additional
stages in order to get this piece of information. If moreover, this eﬀect is
comparatively stronger stage at than at stage n+1, player i may be inclined
to use a lower cut-oﬀ at stage n than at stage n+1. We note that player i’s
assessment of when player j might drop out depends both on (i) the shape
of player j’s future cut-oﬀs and on (i) player i’s belief on player j’s private
belief. More precisely, if the cut-oﬀs of player j are not constant, the fact
that player j drops out two stages after n + 1, or two stages after n, do not
convey the same information about the quality of the arm.
In addition to the equilibrium cut-oﬀs being decreasing, we prove that
they converge to zero, as long as the other player is active. In other words, it
takes really bad news to trigger exit when other players have remained active
for a while. Since private beliefs converge to zero when the common type is
Low,1 this prompts the question of whether the convergence to zero of the
equilibrium cut-oﬀs is slow enough to ensure that all players will eventually
drop out if the type is Low. We show that this is indeed the case, irrespective
of the number of players. The basic idea is that if with positive probability
the other players stay in forever, then from some stage on player i does not
expect to learn any information from the other players’ decisions, so that
she actually faces a one-player problem. However, the one-player problem is
equivalent to a standard one-arm bandit problem, and in this context when
the type is Low the player eventually drops out. By contrast, if the type is
High, there is a positive probability that no player will ever drop out. This
result can be interpreted as a partial eﬃciency result.
Lastly, we analyze equilibrium behavior when the number of players is
large. We provide an almost explicit characterization of the equilibrium out-
1Private beliefs are always the conditional probability that the type is High.
3come. In loose terms, we show that equilibria are asymptotically symmetric
and deterministic. When the population is large enough, if the payoﬀs of
all players were observed at stage 1, then all players would be able to use
this information to deduce if the common type is High or Low and behave
accordingly in stage 2. We prove that when the players do not observe each
other’s payoﬀs a fraction of the player drops out in stage 1, and in stage
2 all remaining players correctly infer the type of the machine and act ac-
cordingly. Therefore, after stage 2 the optimal behavior can be achieved and
the fraction of the players that dropped out in stage 2 if the common type
is High exactly measures the ineﬃciency related to imperfect observation.
More precisely, the equilibrium strategies are as follows. A positive fraction
of players drops out at stage 1, smaller when the common type is High than
when it is Low. Hence, by observing the number of players that dropped out
in the ﬁrst stage all players will correctly infer the true common type in stage
2. Thus, in stage 1, all players compute the option value of waiting with the
anticipation that they will be told the true state in stage 2.
Our model is closely related to the literature on strategic experimentation.
In Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps et al. (2004), players dynamically
allocate their time between a (bandit) machine that yields conditionally i.i.d.
payoﬀs given the common type, and a machine with known output. All
information (payoﬀs) is publicly disclosed. As a consequence, all agents share
the same posterior belief over the common type, which serves as a state
variable. In our model by contrast, diﬀerent players have diﬀerent posterior
beliefs, since each player has two sources of information: her own past payoﬀs,
and the behavior of the other players. Thus, if all players are active at a
certain stage, player i cannot tell whether other players received good news
on the common type, or whether they were encouraged to remain active by
the fact that all other players were active.
In Bolton and Harris (1999), a player may be tempted to devote time
to the known machine, in the hope of beneﬁtting from the experimentation
performed by others. This free-rider eﬀect is mitigated by the so-called en-
couragement eﬀect, according to which a player may choose to experiment, in
order to encourage others to do so, and therefore to beneﬁt from the induced
positive informational externality. Bolton and Harris focus on the interplay
between these two eﬀects. In our game, there is no room for free-riding, since
a player must either bear the cost of experimentation, or exit. Besides, the
encouragement eﬀect is rather deﬁned by the fact that being active is usually
4interpreted as good news on the common type.
Models of strategic experimentation with non-pure informational exter-
nalities within various economic setups were studied in the literature, see,
e.g., Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (1997, 2000), D´ ecamps and Mariotti (forth-
coming).
Our model also relates to the literature on strategic learning. In these
latter models, players are initially endowed with private information on a
state of nature, and decide on a course of action. In the seminal contribu-
tions to this literature (Banerjee, 1992, Bikhchandani et al., 1992), players
play in turn in some exogenously given order. In the contribution that is
closest to ours, Chamley and Gale (1994) (see also Chamley (2004)) analyze
a version with endogenous timing: players may act at most once, at the time
of their choice. Their and our models have common features: both are games
with pure informational externality, irreversible decisions, private informa-
tion and public decisions. However, private information is received only once
in Chamley and Gale’s model, while in our model it keeps ﬂowing in. Be-
sides, Chamley and Gale’s paper is close to the real options framework, and
payoﬀs incur only after the option is exercised. As we show, this diﬀerence
turns out to be irrelevant, and our results are isomorphic to those that would
obtain in a real options framework.
Part of Chamley and Gale’s focus is on eﬃciency, as measured by the
investment delay at equilibrium. In our setup, eﬃciency is rather measured
by the ability of players to discriminate between the two states of nature.
We prove that some ineﬃciency remains at equilibrium, and prove a partial
result related to eﬃciency.
A recent paper by Moscarini and Squintani (2004) studies a R&D race
between ﬁrms with private information – received only once prior to the race
– about the uncertain arrival date of an invention. Firms must pay costs in
order to remain in the race. The ﬁrst to obtain the invention wins the race.
This creates a non-informational strategic interaction between the two ﬁrms.
Another relevant paper is Caplin and Leahy’s (1994) analysis of market
crashes. In their (ﬁnite-horizon) model, players keep receiving private infor-
mation on the ﬁnal state of demand, as long as they do not drop out. Again,
actions are publicly observed. In this respect, this paper is close to the model
we study here. However, Caplin and Leahy assume a continuum of players,
and focus on symmetric equilibria. Under this assumption, and conditional
5on the state of nature, the evolution of players’ beliefs is deterministic. By
contrast, we focus on games with ﬁnitely many players, and prove results
when the number of players grows to inﬁnity. Our results on large games
may be interpreted as providing a positive robustness result for Caplin and
Leahy (1994)’s analysis.
Another trend of literature that is related to our model has to do with
biology. Animals can learn some relevant information by observing the be-
havior of other animals of the same species. For instance a bird can try a
new patch and then either probe it again or just leave it. By observing this
behavior and not the quality of the patch (namely presence or absence of
food) a fellow bird can try to infer if there is some food there or not. Such
behavior has been studied by Valone and Templeton (2002), Giraldeau et al.
(2002).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we present the model,
and in Section 2 the main results of the paper. Section 3 is devoted to an
example. In Section 4 we gain further intuition by studying the beliefs of the
players. Sections 5 and 6 are devoted to the proofs of the results. Technical
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
1 The model
1.1 Rules and assumptions
We here describe in detail the model we deal with. Time is discrete, and
the set of players is a ﬁnite set I. We let N denote the set of nonnegative
integers, including zero.
The players operate replica one-arm bandit machines. The machines have
two possible types: either all bandits are of type H, or all of them are of type
L. Conditional on the type of the machine, payoﬀs are i.i.d. (over stages and
players). The payoﬀ to player i in stage n is Xi
n. At every stage n 2 N each
player has the option to drop out from the game, or to stay in. Dropping out
is irreversible, so that the exit option can be exercised at most once: each
player’s strategic choice reduces to a timing decision. Once a player drops
out, her payoﬀ is zero forever. Finally, players discount future payoﬀs at the
rate ± 2 (0;1).
6A key feature is the information structure of the game. Payoﬀs are pri-
vate information, while exit decisions are publicly observed. Speciﬁcally, the
information available to player i at the beginning of stage n, if still active,
consists of (a) the realized values of Xi
0;¢¢¢ ;Xi
n¡1 and (b) the exit decisions
of the other players, i.e., who dropped out and when.
We let (Ω;P) be the probability space on which all random variables
are deﬁned. We denote by p0 := P(Θ = H) the prior probability that the
common type of the machines is H. We denote by PH := P(¢ j Θ = H) and
PL := P(¢ j Θ = L) the conditional of P, given the common type.
For a random variable X and µ = L;H, we denote by Eµ[X] the expec-
tation of X under Pµ.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumptions:
A1. The variables (Xi
n) have a ﬁnite variance: E[(Xi
n)2] < +1.
A2. The inequalities EH[Xi
n] > 0 > EL[Xi
n] hold.
A3. The conditional law of Xi
n given µ has a continuous density fµ, whose
support is independent of µ.
A4. For any i 2 I and n 2 N, the (random) likelihood ratio fH(Xi
n)=fL(Xi
n)
has a density.2 In addition, letting C ½ R+ denote the support of the
likelihood ratio, one has inf C = 0 and supC = +1.
Assumption A1 is only needed to make sure that the payoﬀ function of
the repeated game is well deﬁned.
Assumption A2 eliminates trivialities: if both expectations were non-
negative (resp. non-positive), it would be a dominant strategy to remain
active forever (resp. drop out at the outset of the game). By A2, one should
think of H as the good type, and of L as the poor one.
Assumptions A3 are A4 are less innocuous. As for A3, the fact that
the supports of fL and fH coincide implies that the common type is never
perfectly inferred. The continuity assumption is made only for technical
convenience. As for A4, the likelihood ratio fH(Xi
0)=fL(Xi
0) directly relates
to the private belief of player i in stage 1. The most signiﬁcant implication is
that this private belief has a density. One of our results – that all equilibria
are in pure strategies – critically depends on it. Finally, the assumption
2By A3, the denominator fL(Xi
n) is non-zero, P-a.s., hence the likelihood ratio is
well-deﬁned.
7inf C = 0 ensures that this private belief takes arbitrarily low positive values
with positive probability, while supC = +1 ensures that it takes arbitrarily
high values. 3
1.2 Comments
In this section we provide few comments and words of interpretation.
1.2.1 The interaction among players
Since payoﬀs depend on the common type they are correlated random vari-
ables. Therefore past payoﬀs contain valuable information on Θ, so that
each player wishes to take into account past payoﬀs of the other players: the
information held by other players matters. On the other hand, the payoﬀ to
a player does not depend on the other players’ decisions or payoﬀs. In that
sense, the interaction among players is purely of an informational nature.
Nevertheless, the information structure renders this interaction complex.
Indeed, assume that all players are still active in some stage n. Player i
cannot tell whether the other players decided to stay in because they received
positive information on Θ, or because they themselves were encouraged by
the fact that others were still active. Assume that players’ strategies are
given. Player i’s private information allows her to compute her belief over
the private information received by player j, which in turn allows player i
to compute her belief over the belief held by player j over her own private
information, and so on. Plainly, this gives rise to an inﬁnite hierarchy of
beliefs over private information – a common feature of many games with
incomplete information. This hierarchy is endogenously determined, as a
function of the strategy choices of the players.
In other words, the only common knowledge events are the public ones:
only past decisions are common knowledge. Our main result shows that, in all
equilibrium, public and private information is incorporated in the equilibrium
strategies in a particularly simple way: the dependency on public and private
information can be separated easily. However, there is no public equilibrium
– equilibrium that depends only on publicly available information.
3Up to some qualiﬁcations, our results are valid without this assumption.
81.2.2 The case of a single player
When there is only one player, our game reduces to an optimal stopping
problem, in which the player has to choose when to switch from the “risky”
action (remain in the game) to the “safe” one (drop out). This optimization
problem is equivalent to the standard one-arm bandit problem, in which
player i is allowed to alternate over time between the two arms. Indeed,
it is well-known in the bandit literature that, if the decision maker ﬁnds it
optimal in some stage to use the safe action, it is optimal to continue with it
forever, see Ferguson (2004) and the references therein. Obviously, our multi-
player game is not equivalent to the game in which players would be allowed
to alternate between the two actions. Indeed, in the latter version players
will have an incentive to “free-ride” over the experimentation performed by
others. However, when all players but one dropped out from the game, the
continuation game faced by the last player can be analyzed using the tools
of the literature on bandit problems.
1.2.3 Timing games and real options
The basic model of real options (see, e.g., McDonald and Siegel (1986), or
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.136)) assumes that an investor has to choose an
investing time, at which she pays a ﬁxed amount C in return for a project,
whose value V evolves stochastically.4
Consider now a situation with I investors and I projects. Each investor i
can invest only in project i, and has to decide when to invest in that project.
The payoﬀ of project i at stage n is Xi
n. Thus, investing at stage n entitles
the investor to receive Xi
n;Xi
n+1; etc. Suppose that with probability p0 all
projects are good, and with probability 1 ¡ p0 they are all bad. Suppose
further that (Xi
n) are i.i.d. given the quality of the project. W.l.o.g., assume
that the ﬁxed cost of investing C is zero.5
We assume that all investors observe past values of their own project, as
well as the investing behavior of other investors, but not past values of other
investors’ projects.
Our analysis applies to this model as well. Indeed, let G0 be the invest-
4This is the discrete-time analog of the continuous-time model described in McDonald
and Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.136).
5Alternatively, we may spread the cost over all stages, and subtract that amount from
all pay-oﬀs.
9ment game we just described, and let G be the timing game described in
Section 1 (with the same data). For every strategy proﬁle Á = (Ái)i2I, de-












=(1 ¡ ±): (1)
Indeed, if player i invests at stage t, her payoﬀ in G is the sum of current
payoﬀs received prior to stage t, while her payoﬀ in G0 is the sum of all stage
payoﬀs, starting from stage t.
This implies that Á is an equilibrium in the investment game G0 if and
only if it is an equilibrium in the timing game with payoﬀs (constant ¡Xi
n),
where the constant is the right hand side of (1).
In particular in the real options framework, all equilibria will be in cut-oﬀ
strategies; when the private belief is computed as the probability that the
project is good, the cut-oﬀs will be increasing with time as long as the other
players did not invest.
1.3 Information, Strategies and Payoﬀs
We collect here deﬁnitions relative to strategies. While concepts are stan-
dard, some technical care is needed, due to the generality of our framework.
Since payoﬀs are continuous random variables, the language of partial his-
tories/decision nodes is inappropriate, and we rely on stochastic processes
notions.
For exposition sake, we consider ﬁrst two-player games.
1.3.1 The information players have
Let a stage n 2 N and a player i = 1;2 be given. The private information
of player i in stage n is the sequence of payoﬀs she has received so far.
Accordingly, we denote by Fi
n := ¾(Xi
0;¢¢¢ ;Xi
n¡1) the ¾-algebra over Ω
induced by these payoﬀs.
In addition to her private information, player i knows when the other
player drops out. At stage n the other player, player j, is either still playing,
or has already quit in a previous stage. This status is denoted by tj
n 2 N[f g,
where tj
n = means that player j is still active at the beginning of stage n,
and for k < n, tj
n = k means that player j has dropped out at stage k.
Generic values for tj
n are denoted ®.
101.3.2 Pure plans of actions
A pure plan of action of player i speciﬁes when to drop out from the game, as
a function of available information. In describing that rule, it is convenient
to separate public from private information as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.1 A pure plan of action of player i consists of a family Ái =
(¿i(®);® 2 N [ f g) of stopping times for the ﬁltration (Fi
n)n2N, with the
property that ¿i(k) > k, P-a.s. for each k 2 N.
The argument ® of ¿i stands for the currently available public informa-
tion. The stopping time ¿i( ) describes player i’s behavior, as long as player j
is still active. It may only depend on private information. Speciﬁcally, given
a stage n 2 N, the event f¿i( ) = ng 2 Fi
n consists of those realizations of
the payoﬀs Xi
0;¢¢¢ ;Xi
n¡1 after which player i would decide to drop out at
stage n – but not earlier – if player j is still active by then.
For k 2 N, the stopping time ¿i(k) describes player i’s behavior after
stage k, in the event player j drops out in stage k, hence the requirement
¿i(k) > k.
Under such a plan Ái, if active in some stage n, player i will act on the
basis of the available information. If player j remained active in stage n¡1,
player i will use ¿i( ): she drops out if ¿i( ) = n, and she continues otherwise.
If instead player j dropped out in stage k < n, player i will use ¿i(k) to decide
on a course of action: namely, she will drop out at stage n if ¿i(k) = n and
continue otherwise.
Our use of the term plan of action conforms with common terminology
(see, e.g., Osborne and Rubinstein (1999)). A plan Ái is not a strategy ac-
cording to game-theoretic terminology, since it does not describe how player
i would play after she dropped out, in the counterfactual event where she
would not have dropped out.67 This being said, we will sometimes refer to
plans of actions as strategies, with the hope that no confusion will arise.
6A pure strategy of player i would specify what to do at each decision node. It can be
deﬁned as a sequence di
n( );di
n(k);k 2 N;n 2 N of Fi
n-measurable functions, with values
in the set fDrop, Continueg. Since we focus on Nash equilibrium analysis, plans of actions
will suﬃce.
7This is not perfectly accurate, since ¿i(k) is deﬁned on Ω, including those !’s such
that ¿i( ) · k. To be fully consistent, the stopping time ¿i(k) should only be deﬁned
on the event f¿i( ) > kg. In particular, any two strategies Ái and Á
0i of player i with
¿i( ) = ¿
0i( ) = 0 are equivalent.
111.3.3 Mixed plans of action
One of our results says that only pure strategies will be used in equilibrium.
We thus need to introduce mixed strategies, only to be able to discard them
later. In ﬁnite games, a mixed strategy is a probability distribution over
pure ones. Such a deﬁnition is problematic for inﬁnite games, and we follow
the approach of Aumann (1964). Speciﬁcally, we introduce for each player
i = 1;2 a copy Ui of the unit internal, endowed with the Lebesgue measure
¸i. The pair (Ui;¸i) serves as an external randomizing device for player
i. The devices of the two players are independent. Thus, we enlarge the
probability space (Ω;P) to (Ω0;P0) := (Ω £ U1 £ U2;P ­ ¸1 ­ ¸2). All
random variables deﬁned over Ω have a natural extension to Ω0. Let Bi and
Ci denote respectively the Borel and the trivial ¾-algebra over Ui. In the
extended framework, the private information available to player i at stage n
is the ¾-algebra e Fi
n = Fi
n ­Bi ­Cj over Ω£Ui £Uj. In words, player i now
knows both her past payoﬀs (Ω-component) and the realization of her own
randomizing device (Ui-component), but does not receive any information on
the realization of the other player’s randomizing device (Uj-component).
A mixed plan of action of player i is a family ¿i(k) (k 2 N [ f g) of
stopping times for the ﬁltration ( e Fi
n)n2N, deﬁned over (Ω0;P0), and such
that ¿i(k) > k, P0-a.s. for each k 2 N.
Throughout the paper, we will assume w.l.o.g. that the probability space
P is rich enough to accommodate a randomizing device for each player, and
take P0 = P. Then mixed plans diﬀer from pure plans only in that the latter
consist of stopping times for the larger ﬁltration ( e Fi
n)n2N.
Alternatively, one may wish to describe a mixed plan by the corresponding
c.d.f.’s (cumulative distribution function). One would deﬁne F i
n( ) to be
the ¸i-probability that player i drops out at or before stage n, if player
j has not dropped out earlier. F i
n(k) is deﬁned analogously. Hence, both
stochastic processes (F i
n( ))n2N and (F i
n(k))n2N are non-decreasing, [0;1]-
valued, adapted to the ﬁltration (Fi
n)n2N. For the equivalence between the
two descriptions the reader is referred to, e.g., Touzi and Vieille (2001).
1.3.4 Payoﬀs
Let a strategy proﬁle (Á1;Á2) be given, and denote by ti(Á1;Á2) 2 N[f+1g
the time at which player i drops out. When there is no risk of confusion, we
will abbreviate ti(Á1;Á2) to ti.











and her expected payoﬀ is °i(Á1;Á2) := E[ri(Á1;Á2)], where the expectation
is taken w.r.t. P.
The existence of the latter expectation will have to be proven, for two







P-a.s., i.e., that the total payoﬀ to player i is well-deﬁned, if she stays in
forever. One then has to check that ri is P-integrable, for each strategy
proﬁle. This is done in Lemma B.2.
1.3.5 Cut-oﬀ strategies
We here describe a simple class of strategies, under which the joint ﬂow
of public and private information is processed in a particularly simple way.
Given a stage n 2 N, we denote by pi
n = P(Θ = H j Fi
n) the conditional
probability that Θ = H, given the private information available at stage n.
We call pi
n the private belief at stage n. Alternatively, this would be the belief
of player i over Θ if she were playing the game alone. Note that pi
0 = p0.
A cut-oﬀ plan of player i is a plan under which exit is triggered as soon
as her private belief falls below a predetermined cut-oﬀ, which depends both
on the current stage and on the activity status of the other players.
Deﬁnition 1.2 A plan of action Ái of player i is called a cut-oﬀ strategy
if, for each ® 2 N [ f g, there exists a map ¼i(®) : N ! [0;1], such that
¿i( ) = inffn ¸ 0: pi
n · ¼i
n( )g and ¿i(k) = inffn > k: pi
n · ¼i
n(k)g, for
each k 2 N.
As is customary, we omit the qualiﬁer “P-a.s.” when speaking of the
equality of two r.v.’s. In particular, stopping times and the private belief pi
n
are only deﬁned up to a P-null set, and the equalities in Deﬁnition 1.2 are
meant to hold P-a.s.
Note that dropping out at stage 0 can be interpreted as a cut-oﬀ plan.
As long as player j is active, player i will compare her private belief at
stage n to the cut-oﬀ ¼i
n( ), and will drop out if it falls below the cut-oﬀ. If
13player j drops out of the game, say at stage k, player i adapts to the new
situation by comparing her private belief to the diﬀerent cut-oﬀs ¼i
n(k). By
deﬁnition, a cut-oﬀ plan is a pure plan. Note that the private information
is incorporated in a cut-oﬀ strategy because the private belief is compared
at each stage with the cut-oﬀ; the public information is incorporated in the
strategy in two ways. Since ¼i
n( ) and ¼i
n+1( ) may diﬀer, the cut-oﬀs depend
on the fact that the other player stays in one additional stage. Since ¼i
n( )
and ¼i
n(k) may diﬀer, the cut-oﬀs depend on the fact that the other player
dropped out.
We warn against a possible misinterpretation: it would not make sense
to deﬁne a cut-oﬀ plan as depending only on player i’s posterior belief over
Θ, given all available information. Indeed, the posterior beliefs of player i
cannot be computed without specifying ﬁrst the strategy used by player j.
Thus, player i’s decision at stage n would depend on player j’s strategy, and
not only on the information set that is reached. Indeed, suppose player j
remains in the game at stage 1. If player j’s strategy is “drop out once the
private belief is below 0.001”, the fact that she did not drop out out is hardly
informative, whereas if her strategy is “drop out once the private belief is
below 0.99”, the fact that she did not drop out may be a very good news
concerning the type of the bandit. Obviously, the posterior belief of player i
will not be the same in the two cases.
In a sense, a cut-oﬀ strategy satisﬁes the Markov property. That is,
a cut-oﬀ strategy depends on the triple (n;pi
n;tj
n). It will later be shown
that the sequence (n;pi
n;tj
n)n2N is a Markov chain, for every strategy proﬁle,
and may therefore serve as a state variable. When compared with Maskin
and Tirole’s (1999) deﬁnition, it may be argued that the private belief pi
n
summarizes the payoﬀ relevant content of the private information, while the
status tj
n summarizes the payoﬀ relevant content of the public information.
Note that at this point we just deﬁne a class of simple strategies. We will
prove later that such strategies are rich enough to be used as equilibrium
strategies.
1.3.6 Multi-player games
In more-than-two-player games, each player i has to keep track of the activity
status of every other player. Hence, a (pure) plan of action is deﬁned as a
family ¿i(~ k) of stopping times, indexed by Infig-vectors ~ k = (kj)j2Infig, with
components kj 2 f g [ N. The component kj is the status variable relative
14to player j. In addition, whenever ~ k 6= ( ;¢¢¢ ; ), the stopping time ¿i(~ k)
must satisfy ¿i(~ k) > maxfkj : kj 6= g. The deﬁnition of mixed and cut-oﬀ
plans extends in a straightforward way. The payoﬀ can be computed as in
two-player games. Details are omitted.
2 Main results
We here state and discuss our main results. To start with, and to serve as a
benchmark, we quote a result relative to the one-player case.
Theorem 2.1 (one-player game) There is a unique optimal stopping time
¿¤. Moreover, ¿¤ := inffn ¸ 0: pn · ¼¤g, for some ¼¤ 2 (0;1).
This theorem follows from classical results in the bandit literature, see,
e.g., Ferguson (2004) and the references therein.
2.1 General results
The results of this subsection are valid, irrespective of the number of players.
We start with an equilibrium existence result.
Theorem 2.2 (existence) The game has a symmetric equilibrium.
As we argue below, there might be several symmetric equilibria. This stands
in sharp contrast to one of the results of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Cripps
et al. (2004), who prove that in their models there is a unique symmetric
Markov equilibrium .
Throughout, we assume all players to be active in stage 0 at equilibrium.
This assumption is automatically satisﬁed if p0 > ¼?. Note also that, if
p0 · ¼?, it is an equilibrium for all players to drop out in stage 0. If p0 · ¼?,
other equilibria may exist, in which all players enter the game.
We now state a ﬁrst result of qualitative nature.
Theorem 2.3 (structure) Under Assumptions A1-4, all Nash equilibria
are in cut-oﬀ strategies.
15We will actually prove a stronger result: the best reply to any strategy
proﬁle is a cut-oﬀ strategy. Thus, it is always suﬃcient to consider cut-oﬀ
strategies.
Theorem 2.3 calls for comments. Since cut-oﬀ strategies are pure, The-
orem 2.3 asserts that all equilibria are pure. Moreover, in all equilibria the
information is processed in a simple way. Thus, (for two-player games) as
long as player j is active, player i compares her private beliefs to some cut-
oﬀs. If player j drops out, she adapts by updating the cut-oﬀs to which her
private beliefs are compared. The (informational) interaction is incorporated
in the way cut-oﬀ values depend on the stage and on the public information.
Note also that the conclusion requires only weak assumptions on PH and
PL. We do not assume that the distribution of payoﬀs under PH stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of payoﬀs under PL, or that the likelihood
ratio fH(¢)=fL(¢) is monotonic increasing. This latter fact has a notewor-
thy implication. In the absence of a monotonic likelihood ratio, the private
beliefs need not be monotonic in one’s own payoﬀs: high payoﬀs need not
be good news, see Milgrom (1982). As a consequence, equilibrium behavior
need not be monotonic in payoﬀs: player i may choose to drop out in stage
1 with a very high payoﬀ in stage 0, but not for some lower values.
2.2 Qualitative results
2.2.1 Two-player games
We now provide more precise statements on the equilibrium cut-oﬀs. We
start with two-player games, since statements are simpler and the results
sharper. When i denotes a player, j is the other player. First, we focus on
the monotonicity of equilibrium cut-oﬀs.
Theorem 2.4 (non-increasing cut-oﬀs) Let an equilibrium with cut-oﬀs
(¼i
n) be given. Then the following properties hold for each of the two players.
P1 The cut-oﬀ sequence (¼i
n( ))n2N is non-increasing;
P2 The cut-oﬀ sequence (¼i
n(k))n2N is constant, for each k 2 N.
In light of the one-player case (see Theorem 2.1), statement P2 is quite
intuitive: once player j drops out from the game, player i faces a one-player
problem with a new posterior that takes into account all her information so
16far, including the fact that player j dropped out. By Theorem 2.1, she will
ﬁnd it optimal to drop out once her posterior belief falls below ¼¤.8
We now discuss P1. If player i enters stage n with a private belief equal
to ¼i
n( ), she will be indiﬀerent between dropping out and staying in. Assume
she stays in and reaches stage n + 1 with the same private belief ¼i
n( ), and
sees that player j still did not drop out. Player i’s posterior belief that
Θ = H is then higher in stage n + 1 than what it was in stage n: all else
being equal, the more stages player j stays in the game, the better news it
is on Θ (provided player j uses a cut-oﬀ strategy). However, the prospects
of deriving in the future additional information over Θ through player j’s
behavior are modiﬁed in a complex way, since it is not clear how the belief
over player j’s stopping time depends on the private belief.
We take this opportunity to clarify the role of the second half of As-
sumption A4 (inf C = 0). Assume by contrast that the likelihood ratio
fH(Xi
0)=fL(Xi
0) only takes values close to one, so that information on Θ is
disclosed very slowly. If the initial belief p0 is high enough, a player will
always ﬁnd it optimal to remain active in stage 1, irrespective of the payoﬀ
received in stage 0, since that payoﬀ cannot convey very bad news on Θ.
The equilibrium cut-oﬀ ¼i
1( ) must reﬂect this property and be such that
P(pi
1 · ¼i
1( )) = 0. Obviously, the value of ¼i
1( ) can then be lowered arbi-
trarily without aﬀecting the equilibrium property. In particular, statement
P1 will not hold without proper qualiﬁcations. Moreover this assumption
implies that for any private belief pi
n at stage n the belief at stage n + 1 can
be arbitrarily low so that for any cut-oﬀ strategy there is a positive proba-
bility of dropping out at each stage; this avoids situations in which a player
dropping out at some stage k would be oﬀ-equilibrium-path.
We next provide some results on the cut-oﬀ values.
Theorem 2.5 (bounds on cut-oﬀs) Let an equilibrium with cut-oﬀs (¼i
n)
be given. Then the following statements hold:
P3 limn!1 ¼i
n( ) = 0 for at least one player i;
8This intuition is incomplete in one respect, since that posterior belief diﬀers from the
private belief of player i. As will be shown, the private belief is in one-one relation with
the posterior belief, and the constant cut-oﬀ ¼¤ on the posterior belief translates to a
constant cut-oﬀ on the private belief.
17P4 For each n 2 N and i = 1;2, one has ¼i
n( ) < ¼¤, where ¼¤ is the optimal
one-player cut-oﬀ level;
P5 For each player i = 1;2 there is a stage k 2 N such that ¼¤ < ¼i
n(k).
Assume moreover that the equilibrium is symmetric (so that ¼i
n = ¼j
n). Then:
P6 there exist 0 < c1 < c2, such that
c1PL(¿
i( ) ¸ n) · ¼
i
n( ) · c2PL(¿
i( ) ¸ n);
for every i 2 I, and every stage n 2 N.
Statement P4 says that having an active opponent should be interpreted
as good news on Θ. Moreover, the very fact that player j might drop out
some time in the future creates a positive informational externality, that does
not exist in the one-player case. Both eﬀects add up, and explain why player
i should be willing to accept lower private beliefs than if she were alone.
In the one-player case, when the discount rate goes to 1, the optimal cut-
oﬀ ¼¤ goes to 0. Hence, P4 implies that as ± ! 1, all equilibrium cut-oﬀs
(¼i
n( )) converge to zero. This is intuitive, since the cost of experimentation
then drops to zero.
According to P3, at least one player must be asymptotically willing to
accept arbitrarily low private beliefs. Assume, say, that all cut-oﬀs of player
j are higher than some ® > 0. If player j does not drop out as time goes by,
player i deduces that all private beliefs of player j have constantly remained
above ® which is very good news on the state; she will therefore drop out
only if her private beliefs are extremely low, i.e. if she got very precise
and negative private information. Note that, in the case of a symmetric
equilibrium, the common sequence ¼i
n( ) of cut-oﬀs then converges to zero.
We now discuss P5. After player j has dropped out from the game in
stage k, player i will stay active until her posterior belief falls below ¼¤.
Altogether, the fact that player j dropped out from the game some time in
the past, is bad news on Θ. However, the news that player j dropped out
speciﬁcally in stage k might be good news, since that implies that player j
did not stop before stage k, which is good news. For such values of k, the
posterior belief of player i will be higher than her private belief, and player i’s
equilibrium cut-oﬀ will satisfy ¼i
n(k) · ¼¤. According to P5, not all values
of k can have this paradoxical feature: there is at least one stage k such that
18seeing the other player drop out at k can be interpreted as bad news on the
state.
Statement P6 provides implicit information on the rate of convergence
of the cut-oﬀs to zero. Note that the probability PL(¿i( ) ¸ n) of survival
depends on past cut-oﬀs ¼i
1( );:::;¼i
n¡1( ), and on the payoﬀ distributions.
The higher the cut-oﬀs, the smaller this probability. If the sequence (¼i
n( ))
decreases very fast to zero, the probability of survival would decrease slowly,
and the left hand-side inequality would fail to hold. If the cut-oﬀs decrease
very slowly, the survival probability would decrease very fast, and the right
hand-side equality would fail to hold.
We next provide a ﬁrst step in the analysis of the eﬃciency of the equi-
librium. Plainly, ﬁrst best considerations require that players drop as early
as possible if Θ = L, and stay active forever if Θ = H. We prove that all
players stay active forever with a positive probability if Θ = H and that all
players drop out in ﬁnite time if Θ = L.
Recall that ti 2 N [ f+1g is the stage at which player i drops out.
Theorem 2.6 (eﬃciency) Let an equilibrium with cut-oﬀs (¼i
n) be given.
Then the following statements hold:
P7 Let t := minft1;t2g. The law of t under PH stochastically dominates the
law of t under PL.
P8 PH(ti = +1;8i 2 I) > 0.
P9 PL(ti < +1;8i 2 I) = 1.
These three statements provide qualitatively similar information. Ac-
cording to P7, the ﬁrst player to stop will stop earlier if the state is L than
if it is H.
According to P8-P9, all players drop out in ﬁnite time if Θ = L whereas,
if Θ = H, there is a positive probability that all players will stay active
forever. Thus, it cannot happen that the common type is L, but both players
stay in because each observes that the other stays in.
2.2.2 N-player games
A proﬁle is symmetric if, for each stage n 2 N, and every two players i and
j, one has ¼i
n(~ ®) = ¼j
n(~ ®0) whenever the vector ~ ®0 is obtained by from the
vector ~ ® by swapping coordinates i and j.
19Once the obvious modiﬁcations on the cut-oﬀs are made, all the results
stated above are valid irrespective of the number N of players, with the
exception of P1 and P2. Indeed, as will be clear in Section 6.1, our proofs in
this case require that the number of players be equal to two. Statement P6
has to be amended to c1PL(¿i( ) ¸ n)N¡1 · ¼i
n( ) · c2PL(¿i( ) ¸ n)N¡1,
for some c1;c2 2 (0;+1).
2.3 Large games
When the number of players is large, equilibria can be described almost
explicitly.
Assuming all players enter the game in stage 0, the only information
available in stage 1 is the payoﬀ received in stage 0. Assume player i remains
active in stage 1 and then discovers, for some reason, the true common type.
Depending on the state, she will choose to drop out at once, or to stay
in forever. Hence, player i’s expected payoﬀ, as viewed from stage 1, is
pi
1EH[Xi
n] + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ pi
1)EL[Xi
n] = 0: This is the highest payoﬀ player i
may hope for, if she stays in.
We deﬁne p¤ to be the value of pi
1 at which a player is indiﬀerent between
dropping out or staying in one additional stage and then being told Θ, i.e.,
the following equality is satisﬁed:
p¤EH[X
i
n] + (1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ p¤)EL[X
i
n] = 0: (2)
Since EH[Xi
n] > 0 > EL[Xi
n], we have 0 < p¤ < 1.
Theorem 2.7 describes the equilibrium behavior in the ﬁrst two stages, as
the number of players gets large. In the ﬁrst stage, all players use a cut-oﬀ
that gets closer to p¤ as N increases. In stage 2, a player drops out or not,
depending on the fraction of players who dropped out in the previous stage,
but (almost) irrespective of her own private belief, and herding takes place.
Similar results can be obtained for subsequent stages.
Theorem 2.7 (large games) For each N 2 N, let ÁN be an equilibrium of
the N-player game, with cut-oﬀs (¼N;i














n ( ) = 0; for every n > 1:
20² Let ~ ®N be a possible status vector of all players j 6= i, and let ½N :=
1
N¡1jfj: ®N
j = 1gj be the fraction of players who stayed in at stage 1.
Assume that limN!+1 ½N = ½ 2 [0;1]. There is a threshold ½¤ 2 (0;1)
such that the equilibrium cut-oﬀs in stage 2 satisfy the following.














The driving force behind the ﬁrst statement is a large number intuition.
In large games, given Θ = µ, it is very likely that the proportion of players
who drop out at stage 1 be close to a constant ½µ. It is higher when the
common type is L than when it is H: ½L > ½H. Thus, in stage 2, all active
players will be able to infer Θ from the proportion of players who dropped
out at stage 1. Knowing this, all players at stage 1 will compute the option
value of waiting, as if the common type is going to be revealed at the next
stage. In addition, all players that are still active in stage 2 drop out if they
deduce that µ = L and stay in for ever if they conclude that µ = H.
Roughly, if Θ = L, all players will either drop out in stage 1 or in stage 2.
On the other hand, if Θ = H, a ﬁxed proportion will drop out in stage 1 and
other players will remain active forever. In particular, when the population is
large (i) full learning of the state occurs after one stage (for all the still active
players), and (ii) the fraction of players dropping out in stage 1 if Θ = H
precisely describes the eﬃciency loss inherent to the learning problem.
Thus, with high probability, the fraction of players ½ dropping out after
a single stage is either close to ½L or to ½H. The statement 2 describes what
happens in the rare event where this does not occur. As stated, there is a
threshold ½? on ½ below which (resp. above which) player i will drop out
(resp. stay in), irrespective of her own private belief.
Caplin and Leahy (1994) consider a similar setup with a continuum of
players and directly analyze the deterministic equilibrium learning process,
focusing on symmetric equilibrium proﬁles. By contrast, our result does not
impose any symmetry restriction on the equilibrium, and studies the conver-
gence properties, as the set of players converges to the continuum. In a sense,
Theorem 2.7 may be seen as supporting Caplin and Leahy’s analysis in two
respects: (i) as N ! +1, all equilibria become asymptotically symmetric
and (ii) the continuum-player case appears as the limit of large games.
212.4 Discussion
The statements above provide only few qualitative insights. Additional com-
parative statics would be desirable. For instance, it would be interesting to
understand the eﬀect on equilibrium cut-oﬀs of the variance of the payoﬀ
distributions, of the number of players, etc. Such results would necessitate
a ﬁne analysis of the optimal continuation payoﬀ. We brieﬂy describe below
the determinants of the optimal continuation payoﬀ, in order to understand
the inherent diﬃculties.
We let a cut-oﬀ strategy Á2 of player 2 be given. In stage n, player 1
will choose to drop out if her optimal continuation payoﬀ does not exceed
zero, and will otherwise choose to continue. Assume player 1 reaches stage n
with a private belief equal to p1. The continuation payoﬀ induced by a given
(cut-oﬀ) strategy Á1 against Á2 can be computed as follows (assuming player
2 is still alive).
Step 1: Assess the joint (conditional) law Q of the common type Θ and of
the private belief p2
n held by player 2, given all available information.
Observe that Q depends on p1, on n, and on the cut-oﬀs ¼2
k( ) (k < n)
associated with Á2 in previous stages.
Step 2: For each µ = L;H and p2 2 (0;1), ﬁnd the continuation payoﬀ ¸1 to
player 1, in the event where the common type is µ and player 2 reached
stage n with a private belief p2. To be speciﬁc: the ﬁrst player to
drop out will do so at stage t := inffk ¸ n : pi
k · ¼i
k( ); for some i =
1;2g. If p1
t · ¼1
t( ), player 1 drops out and her total continuation





t( ), player 1 continues until stage t1 := inffk > t : p1
k · ¼1
k(t)g.
Thus, the computation of ¸1 involves the (conditional) joint law of t
and of the payoﬀs (X1
k)k¸n, given that (Θ;p2
n) = (µ;p2). Observe that
¸1 depends on µ, on private beliefs’ levels p1;p2, and on the thresholds
¼i
k( ) (k ¸ n) associated with Ái in the present and following stages.
The continuation payoﬀ induced by the strategy pair (Á1;Á2) is the ex-
pectation of ¸1 under Q.
For comparative statics purposes, it is instructive to analyze the depen-
dency of Q and ¸1 on each parameters.
As for Q, the case is clear in most respects. Indeed,9
9The ﬁrst and third statements are formally proven below.
22² Q is increasing in p1 (in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance).
The intuition is that the posterior belief that Θ = H is increasing in
p1, while the private belief p2
n will tend to be higher if Θ = H than if
Θ = L.
² Q is increasing with the cut-oﬀs ¼2
k( ), k < n. The intuition is the same
as above.
² Finally, for ﬁxed p1 and Á2, the posterior belief p2 that Θ = H increases
with n (this relies on Á2 being a cut-oﬀ strategy). On the other hand,
private beliefs of player 2 tend to decrease with time if Θ = L. If we
assume moreover that player 2 is active, it is unclear how the distribu-
tion of p2
n changes with n if the state is L.10 The overall change in Q
is unclear.
As for ¸1, the situation is less clear. When p2 is lowered to e p2 < p2,
it is more likely that player 2 will be the ﬁrst one to drop out, and public
information arrives earlier. In many cases – but not all – player 1 will then
drop out earlier in the new situation. Observe that this conclusion holds
irrespective of µ. Consequently, the continuation payoﬀ will increase if Θ = L,
but decrease if Θ = H.
When cut-oﬀs associated with Á2 are increased, this analysis remains
valid. Finally, the change of ¸1 with n is ambiguous.
3 An Example
// Insert here //
4 Beliefs
We here deﬁne the two kinds of beliefs. The private belief of a player incor-
porates only her (private) payoﬀs. The posterior belief includes all available
information. We focus on the evolution of the private belief through time,
and on the relation between the two beliefs. In particular, it is instructive
to know when the available information on player j’s does induce player i to
10If the state is H, the conditional distribution of p2
n, given that player 2 is still active,
unambiguously increases with n.
23optimism – so that player i’s posterior belief will be higher than her private
belief. Technical proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
4.1 Private beliefs
4.1.1 The private belief
The private belief pi
n := P(Θ = H j Fi
n) of player i in stage n, is the
conditional probability that Θ = H, based on her private information. Thus,
pi
0 = p0 for each i 2 I.
A version of the private belief pi

















It expresses how the likelihood ratio of H and L (left-hand side) changes
with the initial likelihood ratio and the likelihood ratio of the payoﬀs.
By assumption A4 and (3) we have:
Lemma 4.1 The r.v. pi
n has a density, for every player i 2 I and every
stage n 2 N.
4.1.2 The evolution of the private belief
We recall without proof the following well-known properties of the sequence
(pi
n)n2N: beliefs tend to increase (resp. to decrease) if the state is H (resp. L),
and are asymptotically correct.
Proposition 4.2 Under P, the sequence (pi




n) is a submartingale that converges a.s. to one.
Under PL, (pi
n) is a supermartingale that converges a.s. to zero.
In addition, for a ﬁxed stage n, the private belief pi
n is likely to be higher
if the state is actually H than if it is L. The basic result in this vein is
Lemma 4.3 below.
Lemma 4.3 The law of pi
1 under PH stochastically dominates (in the ﬁrst-
order sense) the law of pi
1 under PL.11
11Let ¹ and ¸ be two distributions over the real line. We say that ¹ stochastically
dominates ¸ if ¹((¡1;x)) · ¸((¡1;x)) for every x 2 R.
24We now extend this result in two ways. First, we show that a sharper
result holds in our setup. It relies on the fact that pi
1 has a density, and that
both distributions PH and PL diﬀer.
Proposition 4.4 For µ 2 fL;Hg, let Fµ denote the c.d.f. of pi
1 under Pµ.
For each p 2 (0;1] such that FH(p) < 1 and FL(p) > 0, one has
FH(p) < FL(p):
Next, we prove that the result of Lemma 4.3 generalizes to the sequence
of private beliefs.
Proposition 4.5 For each n 2 N, the law of the vector (pi
1;¢¢¢ ;pi
n) under
PH stochastically dominates the law of (pi
1;¢¢¢ ;pi
n) under PL.12
Moreover, for each x1;:::;xn 2 [0;1], one has PL(pi
1 > x1;¢¢¢ ;pi
n >
n) · PH(pi
1 > x1;¢¢¢ ;pi
n > xn).
The second assertion of proposition 4.5 does not follow from the ﬁrst.
An immediate consequence of Proposition 4.5 is that, assuming the other
player is still active, a player will tend to drop out earlier when Θ = L than
when Θ = H.
Corollary 4.6 For every cut-oﬀ strategy Ái = (¿i(®))®2N[f g we have
PH(¿
i( ) ¸ n) ¸ PL(¿
i( ) ¸ n); 8n 2 N:
Another simple consequence is that when the common type is H there is
a positive probability that a player who uses a ﬁxed-cut-oﬀ strategy will stay
in forever.
Corollary 4.7 Let p < p0 and i = 1;2 be given, and set t = inffn 2 N :
pi
n · pg. Then one has PH(t < +1) < 1.
Proof. By Proposition 4.2, (pi
n) is a submartingale under PH, bounded
by one. Fix N 2 N. By the optional sampling theorem applied to the







· PH(t > N) + pPH(t · N):
When N increases to inﬁnity, PH(t · N) and PH(t > N) converge to PH(t <




12Let ¹ and ¸ be two distributions over Rn. We say that ¹ stochastically dominates ¸
if ¹(C) · ¸(C) for every set C of the form (¡1;x1) £ (¡1;x2) £ ¢¢¢ £ (¡1;xn).
254.2 Posterior beliefs
4.2.1 The posterior belief
We now introduce the posterior belief that takes into account both private
and public information. As emphasized earlier, computing the posterior be-
lief requires the knowledge of the other player’s strategy. We therefore let
an arbitrary strategy Áj = (¿j(k))k2N[f g of player j be given. The public
information at stage n is the status of the players, which is described by the
status variables (ti
n).




n). The posterior belief of player i at stage n is
deﬁned to be qi
n := P(Θ = H j Gi
n).
















PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)







PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)
PL(¿j( ) ¸ n)
:
(4)











PH(¿j( ) = k)
PL(¿j( ) = k)
: (5)
The lemma follows by Bayes’ rule, using the fact that the ¾-algebra Fi
n
and the random variable tj
n are conditionally independent given Θ. Details
are omitted.
By Lemma 4.8, the posterior belief qi
n depends only on pi
n and on the
status tj
n of player j. We denote by Qi
n(pi
n;tj
n) this version of qi
n. On the
event tj





n; ) is given by equation (4).
On the event tj
n = k, the value of Qi
n(pi
n;tj
n) is given by (5). In particular in
this explicit version of qi
n, the posterior belief is continuous and monotonic
increasing in the private belief. Moreover, the dependency of the posterior
belief with private belief and public information is fairly simple. We study
the dependency between qi
n and pi
n more carefully in the next subsection.
4.2.2 Posterior vs. private belief
We here focus on the interplay between the private and posterior beliefs of
player i, assuming player j follows a cut-oﬀ strategy. We use Lemma 4.8
26to disentangle the eﬀect of private and public information on the posterior
belief.
Equations (4) and (5) directly imply that if we ﬁx the status of the other
player, the posterior belief is increasing in the private belief. This property
is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9 For each n 2 N, the function Qi
n(p;®) is continuous and
increasing in p.
We now argue that having an active opponent is always good news on Θ,
and the posterior belief is always higher than the private belief.
Proposition 4.10 For each n 2 N and p 2 [0;1], one has Qi
n(p; ) ¸ p.
Proof. Let n 2 N, and p 2 [0;1] be given. By Corollary 4.6, PH(¿j( ) ¸
n) ¸ PL(¿j( ) ¸ n). The result follows from (4).
All we used in the proof is the inequality PH(¿j( ) ¸ n) ¸ PL(¿j( ) ¸ n).
It is equivalent to PH(¿j( ) < n) · PL(¿j( ) < n), so that PH(¿j( ) = k) ·
PL(¿j( ) = k), for at least one stage k < n. For such a k, by (5), one has
Qi
n(p;k) · p. Thus, we have proven Proposition 4.11.
Proposition 4.11 For each n ¸ 2, there is k < n such that Qi
n(p;k) · p,
for every p 2 [0;1].
The following proposition asserts that the posterior belief when the op-
ponent is active is always higher than when she has already dropped out.
Proposition 4.12 For every two stages k < n 2 N, and every p 2 [0;1],
one has Qi
n(p; ) > Qi
n(p;k).
Proof. Let m;n 2 N be given. To serve as a useful technical device,
we introduce the belief pi;j
n;m := P(Θ = H j Fi
n;Fj
m) over Θ, obtained by
collecting the private information of player i at stage n and of player j at
stage m. Since the term
p0

























n;m coincides with a continuous and increasing function of pi
n and
pj





m) := PH(Θ = H j pi
n;tj






By the law of iterated conditional expectations, and since tj





































m = , one has pj
m > ¼j
m( ). Since pi;j








m( )). By contrast, if tj









m( )). Combining the two inequalities yield
Q
i
n;m(p;m ¡ 1) < Q
i
n;m(p; ): (6)
Next, we compare Qi
n;m(p; ) with Qi
n;m+1(p; ). Using once more the law


























It follows that Qi
n;m(p; ) is in the convex hull of (i) Qi
n;m+1(p; ), of (ii)
Qi
n;m+1(p;m), and of (iii) Qi
n;m(p;k) = Qi
n;m+1(p;k) for each k < m.
Using now (6), one gets
Q
i
n;m+1(p;m ¡ 1) = Q
i
n;m(p;m ¡ 1) < Q
i
n;m(p; ) < Q
i
n;m+1(p; ):
The result follows inductively, since Qi
n;n is equal to Qi
n, the posterior belief
of player i at stage n.
4.3 Markov properties of the beliefs
Markov chains are stochastic sequences whose current value contain all rele-
vant information when it comes to predicting future values of the sequence.
Some of the sequences we introduced turn out to be Markov chains. These
properties will be decisive when proving that all equilibria are in cut-oﬀ
strategies.
We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of a Markov chain, see Shiryaev (1984).13
13By Theorems 9.5 and 9.6 in Doob (1953), this deﬁnition is equivalent to saying that
the conditional law of An+1 given Gn is one version of the conditional law of An+1 given
An.
28Deﬁnition 4.13 Let (Gn)n2N be a ﬁltration over a probability space (Ω;P),
and let (An)n2N be a sequence of random variables, adapted to (Gn)n2N, and
with values in Rd. The sequence (An) is a Markov chain for the ﬁltration
(Gn)n2N if, for each Borel set B ½ Rd and n 2 N, one has P(An+1 2 B j
Gn) = P(An+1 2 B j An), P-a.s.
The next proposition lists the sequences which form Markov chains in our
setup. The proof is provided in Appendix B.2.
Proposition 4.14 Under P, the sequence (pi
n;tj
n)n2N is a Markov chain for
(Gi
n)n2N.
Both under P and under Pµ, the sequence (pi
n)n2N is a Markov chain for
(Fi
n)n2N.
Under Pµ, both sequences (pi
n) and (tj
n) are Markov chains for the ﬁltra-
tion (Gi
n).
The ﬁrst statement means that all the information available to player i
can be summarized by her private belief and by the status of player j.
The second statement simply says that the private belief adequately sum-
marizes the privately available information. By contrast, since the status of
the other player provides important information on the common type, the
private belief does not fully summarize the information available to a player.
Therefore, the sequence (pi
n)n2N is not a Markov chain for (Gi
n)n2N under P.
For a similar reason, the sequence (tj
n)n2N is not a Markov chain for (Gi
n)n2N
under P either.
Given the common type, the signals of the players are independent.
Therefore, in this case, the private information or the status of one player do
not help in predicting future private belief or the future status of the other
player. This is the content of the third statement.
5 Proofs of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3
This section is devoted to Theorems 2.2 and 2.3, which assert the existence
of a symmetric equilibrium, and that all equilibria are in cut-oﬀ strategies.
Here we provide the main steps and the intuition. Most proofs are relegated
to appendix B.
We ﬁx an arbitrary mixed plan Áj = f¿j(®);® 2 N [ f gg of player j be






that contains the randomization devices of the two players.
29For every plan Ái of player i, player i’s payoﬀ °i(Ái;Áj) depends on Áj
only through player j’s behavior until i drops out. Indeed, player j’s behavior
once player i drops out does not aﬀect i’s payoﬀ. Hence, as far as only player
i’s best reply problem is under study, we may assume that ¿j(k) = ¿j( ), for
each k 2 N. In other words, we will assume that player j’s behavior depends
only on her private information, and abbreviate ¿j( ) to ¿j.
The best-reply problem faced by player i can be rephrased as an optimal
stopping problem: given Áj, there is a one-to-one relationship between mixed
plans of actions and stopping times for (Gi
n)n2N, which is made explicit in
appendix B.2. We emphasize that this identiﬁcation is contingent on the
choice of Áj.










Hence, when using the stopping time ¾, her expected payoﬀ is E[Y i
¾], and
the best-reply problem of player i reduces to that of solving





where the supremum is taken over all stopping times ¾ for (Gi
n).
We will assert that there is a unique solution to Problem P, that moreover










be the discounted sum of payoﬀs that incur between stages n and ¾, dis-
counted to stage n.
Let Λn denote the set of stopping times ¾ such that ¾ ¸ n. Denote by
W i
n the optimal continuation payoﬀ of player i at stage n, if she must stay
in at stage n. Formally it is given by14
W
i









14The essential supremum ess supx2XYx of a family (Yx)x2X of r.v.’s is the r.v. Y such
that (i) for each x, Y ¸ Yx P-a.s. and (ii) for any variable Z that satisﬁes Z ¸ Yx P-a.s.
for every x one has Z ¸ Y , P-a.s.
30If W i
n > 0, staying in is the optimal action at stage n, if W i
n < 0, dropping
out is the optimal action at stage n, while if W i
n = 0, player i is indiﬀerent
between staying in and dropping out. This assertion, stated formally in
Lemma 5.1 below, is a very general result in optimal stopping. It follows
from Chow and Robbins (1963), or Ferguson (2004, ch. 3).
Lemma 5.1 Deﬁne
¾
¤ = inffn ¸ 0: W
i
n · 0g (with inf ; = +1):
Then ¾¤ is a solution to problem P. Moreover, if ¾ is an optimal stopping
time, then ¾ ¸ ¾¤, P-a.s.
More generally, let a stage n 2 N be given, and set ¾¤
n+1 := inffk ¸
n + 1 : W i









We will next prove that ¾¤ depends only on the sequence (pi
n;tj
n).
Lemma 5.2 There is a sequence vi
k of measurable maps, such that
¾
¤







Accordingly, the information of player i can be summarized by her private
belief and the status variable of player j. The proof of Lemma 5.2 is a variant
on standard tools in the optimal stopping of Markov chains.
Using Lemma 5.2 and the relation between posterior and private beliefs












































































In addition, we will choose versions of the conditional probability PH(¾¤
n+1 >
n + k j (pi
n;tj
n)) such that wi
n has the desirable properties listed in Lemma
5.3 below.
31Lemma 5.3 For every ﬁxed status variable ® 2 N [ f g, wi
n(p;®) is an
increasing and continuous function of p on (0;1).
When the type of the bandit is known, the player ignores the information
received from the other player, and either drops out as soon as possible or
stays in forever, depending on this type. We therefore have the following
result.
Lemma 5.4 limp!0 wi
n(p;®) = EL[Xi
0] < 0 <
EH[Xi
0]
1¡± = limp!1 wi
n(p;®).
Given ® and by Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, there is a unique p such that
wi
n(p;®) = 0. Therefore, the optimal stopping time ¾¤ is a cut-oﬀ plan.
By our non-atomicity conditions, the probability that the private belief
is ever equal to the cut-oﬀ is 0.
Corollary 5.5 Player i has a unique best reply to Áj. This best-reply is a
cut-oﬀ plan.
We now turn to the existence of an equilibrium. We apply a ﬁxed point
theorem. The set Φi of cut-oﬀ strategies of player i is the set of sequences
(¼i
n(k)) indexed by n 2 N and k 2 f ;1;¢¢¢ ;n ¡ 1g, and with values in
[0;1]. We endow Φi with the product topology, and the set Φ1£Φ2 of cut-oﬀ
proﬁles with the product topology. Then Φi is compact.
Lemma 5.6 The payoﬀ function °i is continuous over Φi £ Φj.
Proof. Given a cut-oﬀ proﬁle (Ái;Áj), the payoﬀ to player i is Y i
n if player
i drops out at stage n.
The event that player i drops out at stage n is the union of ﬁnitely many
events: (i) player i drops out at stage n, and player j is active at stage n¡1,
and (ii) player i drops out at stage n, and player j dropped out at stage k,
with k < n.





































































32and the expected payoﬀ to player i is °i(Ái;Áj) := E[ri(Ái;Áj)].
Let now a sequence (Ái
m;Áj
m) of cut-oﬀ proﬁles be given, that converges
to (Ái;Áj) in the product topology.
Note that limm!+1 ri(Ái
m;Áj










l( ); for some l 2 N
ª
:
Since the laws of pi
n and of pj




m)j · supn2N jY i
nj and jri(Ái;Áj)j · supn2N jY i
nj, the dom-
inated convergence theorem applies, and limm!1 °i(Ái
m;Áj
m) = °i(Ái;Áj).
Lemma 5.7 There is a symmetric equilibrium.













By Corollary 5.5, B(Á0) is singleton-valued, hence may be viewed as a func-
tion from Φi into itself. By Lemma 5.6, B is continuous over Φi. Since Φi
and Φj are compact, by Ky Fan’s theorem B has a ﬁxed point Á¤. Plainly,
the strategy proﬁle (Á¤;Á¤) is a symmetric equilibrium of the game.
Remark 5.8
We end this section by observing that there might be multiple symmetric
equilibria. Indeed, suppose that the initial belief is p0 = ¼¤, the cut-oﬀ in
the one-player problem. As said earlier, it is then an equilibrium for both
players to drop out immediately. Besides, each player has a strategy which
stays in at stage 0 and ensures a payoﬀ 0.
We will now informally argue that there is another symmetric equilibrium.
Let Ψi be the space of cut-oﬀ strategies of player i in which she stays in at
stage 0. Deﬁne Ψj analogously.
As Ψi and Ψj are compact, Lemma 5.6 implies the existence of a sym-
metric ﬁxed-point to the best reply function. Corollary 5.5 implies that this
ﬁxed point is in cut-oﬀ strategies, and by P1 the sequence of cut-oﬀs is
non-increasing.
Since each player can ensure 0 by ignoring the actions of the other player,
the expected payoﬀ in this ﬁxed point is non-negative. In particular, this
33ﬁxed point is a symmetric equilibrium. Since in this equilibrium both players
continue in stage 0, this equilibrium diﬀers from the previous one.
We now argue that the expected payoﬀ in this equilibrium is strictly
positive, so the two equilibria yield diﬀerent payoﬀs.
The probability that player j will drop out in stage 1 is positive (by A4),
and less than one (by Proposition 4.14 and since cut-oﬀs are non-increasing).
Therefore, if player i stays in until stage 2, player j’s decision in stage 1
reveals meaningful information about Θ. Therefore, the ex ante optimal
payoﬀ to player i is strictly higher than what she would get on the basis of
private information only, and hence higher than zero, as desired.
This sketch suggests that there are two equilibria, one in which both
players drop out in stage zero, and the other in which both players are active
in stage zero. Whether or not there is a unique equilibrium of the latter type
is an open problem.
6 Qualitative features
We now proceed to the proof of Theorems 2.4 through 2.6. The proof of P2
will be omitted. All proofs are logically independent, with the exception of
the proof of P8, which relies on P2. The section is organized as follows.
We start with P1, then insert a basic observation. We write the proofs for
the case of two players. For statements P3 through P9, the extension to
more-than-two-player games adaptation presents no diﬃculty. In the case of
P1, we will mention why this is not so.
6.1 Proof of P1
We here prove Proposition 6.1 below, which implies P1 in Theorem 2.4.
Proposition 6.1 Let Á2 be a cut-oﬀ plan of player 2, and let Á1 be the
unique best reply to Á2, with cut-oﬀs (¼1
n). Then the sequence (¼1
n( )) is
non-increasing.
Proof. The formal proof involves a long list of inequalities. We provide
a detailed sketch, which can be easily transformed into the formal proof.
We let a cut-oﬀ strategy Á2 of player 2 be given, and look at the optimiza-
tion problem of player 1. We proceed by comparing the following situations
player 1 can face in the game:
34(A) p1
n = p and t2
n = : this is the game in stage n.
(B) p1
n = p, t2
n = , and there is an additional interim stage n¡ 1
2 (between
stages n ¡ 1 and n) in which only player 1 observes a signal (but the
players make no choice) – this situation is purely ﬁctitious.
(C) p1
n+1 = p, t2
n = , and from stage n on player 1 observes the status of
player 2 with a delay of one stage.
(D) p1
n+1 = p and t2
n = .
(E) p1
n+1 = p and t2
n+1 = : this is the game in stage n + 1.
Our goal is to compare situations (A) and (E). That is, to prove that player
1’s optimal continuation payoﬀ (OCP in short) at stage n in situation (A)
does not exceed player 1’s OCP at stage n + 1 in situation (E). This will
show that w1
n(p; ) · w1
n+1(p; ) for every p. In particular, 0 = w1
n(¼1
n( ); ) ·
w1
n+1(¼1
n( ); ). Since w1
n+1 is non-decreasing, this implies that ¼1
n+1( ), which
is deﬁned by the equality w1
n+1(¼1
n+1( ); ) = 0, is below ¼1
n( ), as desired.
We will do that by comparing the various situations.
Step 1: Variations (A) and (B).
All relevant information contained in past payoﬀs is summarized in the
private belief: it is irrelevant that in (A) and (B) diﬀerent payoﬀs and a
diﬀerent number of payoﬀs lead to the same private belief. Since from stage
n the two situations coincide, player 1’s OCP at stage n in both situations
is the same.
Step 2: Variations (B) and (C).
The continuation game in situation (B) from stage n is equivalent to the
continuation game in situation (C) from stage n+1 and on. Therefore player
1’s OCP at stage n in situation (B) is equal to player 1’s OCP at stage n+1
in situation (C).
Step 3: Variations (C) and (D).
The only diﬀerence between the continuation games from stage n + 1 in
the two situations is that in (C) information is delayed for player 1. Hence
in (C) player 1 has fewer available plans, so that player 1’s OCP at stage
n + 1 in situation (C) does not exceed her expected OCP at stage n + 1 in
situation (D).
Step 4: Variations (D) and (E).
Here we deﬁne yet another situation:
35(F) p1
n+1 = p and t2
n+1 = n.
this is the case in which player 2 drops out at stage n.
Player 1’s expected OCP at stage n+1 in situation (D), in which player 1
knows that player 2 was still active at the beginning of stage n, is a weighted
average of her OCPs in situations (E) and (F). Indeed, in the former she has
just learned that player 2 is still active in stage n+1, while in the latter she
has just learned that player 2 has dropped out in stage n.
Therefore, to prove that the OCP in situation (D) is at most her OCP in
situation (E), it is suﬃcient to prove that the OCP in situation (F) does not
exceed that in continuation (E).
Let ¾ be an optimal strategy of player 1 in situation (F), starting from
stage n+1. This is an optimal strategy of player 1 in a one-player problem,
hence, by Theorem 2.1 (and (5)), ¾ is a cut-oﬀ plan, with a ﬁxed cut-oﬀ.
Suppose that player 1 follows ¾ in situation (E), starting from stage n + 1.
Conditional on Θ, the continuation payoﬀs in situations (E) and (F) coincide.
Besides, this continuation payoﬀ is positive if Θ = H, and negative if Θ = L.
In addition, the posterior belief that Θ = H is higher in (E) than in (F).
Altogether, this implies that the expected continuation payoﬀ induced by ¾
is higher in (E) than in (F). Since ¾ is an available strategy for player 1 from
stage n+1 in situation (E), the OCP in situation (E) is at least equal to the
continuation payoﬀ induced by ¾ in (F). Hence the OCP in (E) is larger than
the OCP in (F) so that the OCP in (D) is smaller than the OCP in (E).
6.2 Simple bounds
We here point out simple bounds on the optimal continuation payoﬀ to player
i. These bounds will help to derive basic, yet useful, observations on equi-
librium cut-oﬀs.
Lemma 6.2 Let a strategy Áj, and a stage n 2 N be given. The optimal
continuation payoﬀ W i





















Proof. We start with the lower bound. If player i – when active in stage
n – decides to stay in forever, her expected payoﬀ in every stage coincides
36with the left-hand side in (9). Since staying in forever is one of many options,
this proves the ﬁrst inequality in (9).
We now prove the upper bound. The argument is valid since by A1,
Xi
n has ﬁnite expectation and variance. If the type of the bandit is H, the
maximal payoﬀ a player can get is EH[Xi
n]=(1 ¡ ±). Since W i
n is the payoﬀ
when player i must stay in for at least one stage, and since EL[Xi
0] is negative,
when the type of the bandit is L the optional sampling theorem implies that
the payoﬀ is at most EL[Xi












and the right-hand side inequality follows.







2 (0;1) be the value of qi
n for which the left-hand side
in (9) is zero, and recall that p¤ 2 (0;1) has been deﬁned as the value of qi
n
for which the right-hand side is zero.
Corollary 6.3 Let Á be an equilibrium.
If player i ﬁnds it optimal to drop out at stage n, then qi
n · ¯ p.
If player i ﬁnds it optimal to remain active in stage n, then qi
n ¸ p¤.
Indeed, one has W i
n · 0 in the former case, and W i
n ¸ 0 in the latter.
In stage 1 – and only in that stage – one has qi
n = pi
n, since all players
are anyway active in stage 0. Besides, one has qi
n ¸ pi
n whenever player j is
active. Thus, Corollary 6.3 implies the following.
Corollary 6.4 Let Á be an equilibrium with cut-oﬀs (¼i
n). Then (i) for each
player i one has p¤ · ¼i
1( ) · ¯ p, and (ii) for n ¸ 1, one has ¼i
n( ) · ¯ p.
6.3 Proof of P3
We here prove P3. Plainly, the result holds if limn!+1 ¼j
n( ) = 0. Hence, we
may assume that limsupn!+1 ¼j
n( ) > 0. As we will show, this implies that
limn!+1 ¼i
n( ) = 0.
If the players are active in stage 0, then ¼
j
0( ) < p0; since cutoﬀs are
decreasing, ¼j
n( ) < p0, for any stage n. Therefore, one has PH(¿j( ) =
37+1) > 0 by Corollary 4.7. On the other hand, (pj
n) converges PL-a.s. to
zero. Since cut-oﬀs (¼j




PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)
PL(¿j( ) ¸ n)
= +1: (10)
We now deduce that limsupn!1 ¼i
n( ) · p for every positive p, which
implies that the limit exists and is 0, as desired.
Fix p 2 (0;1], and let n 2 N be an arbitrary stage. Suppose that tj
n =
and pi











PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)





PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)
PL(¿j( ) ¸ n)
: (11)
In the light of (10), this implies that qi
n > ¯ p, provided n is large enough. Using
Corollary 6.3, we have therefore proven that wi
n(pi
n; ) > 0 P-a.s. whenever
pi
n ¸ p and n is large enough. In particular, ¼i
n( ) · p, and the result follows.
6.4 Proof of P4 and P5
We limit ourselves to a heuristic proof. The corresponding formal proof is a
simple but tedious elaboration, and is therefore omitted.
We start with P4. The analysis of the optimal stopping problem in
Section 5 applies to the one-player problem. Dropping superscripts, one has,
in the case of 1 player, Wn = E[Yn!¾n+1 j Fn] = wn(pn), where ¾n+1 :=
inffk ¸ n + 1 : pk · ¼¤g.
Let a stage n 2 N be given, and consider any player i. If player j is still
active at stage n, then qi
n ¸ pi
n, and player i has more strategies available
in the continuation game, than if she were in the one-player case. As a
consequence, her OCP is higher than in the one-player case.
We continue with P5. If player j drops out at stage k, the belief of player











PH(¿j( ) = k)
PL(¿j( ) = k)
. Once player j
drops out, player i faces a one-player problem with a ﬁxed cut-oﬀ ¼¤. Hence,
in the continuation game, player i drops out once qi








PH(¿j( )=k). In particular, ¼i
n(k) > ¼¤ if and only if
PH(¿j( ) = k) < PL(¿j( ) = k).
To prove the existence of such a k, it suﬃces to choose k = 1 and to
observe that PL(¿j( ) = 1) > 0 (since pi
1 takes arbitrary low values with
38positive values) while PH(¿j( ) = 1) < 1. Therefore, by Proposition 4.4, one
has PH(¿j( ) = 1) < PL(¿j( ) = 1).
6.5 Proof of P7, P8 and P9
We start with P7:
Lemma 6.5 For every cut-oﬀ proﬁles (¿i(®)) and (¿j(®)), the law of minf¿i( );¿j( )g
under PH stochastically dominates the law of the same variable under PL.
Proof. The variables ¿i( ) and ¿j( ) are independent under Pµ, so that
Pµ(minf¿i( );¿j( )g ¸ n) = Pµ(¿i( ) ¸ n) £ Pµ(¿j( ) ¸ n). The result
follows from Corollary 4.6.
We proceed with P9 claiming that there is a positive probability under
PH that no player ever stops.
We ﬁrst argue that
PH(¿
i( ) < +1) < 1; 8i 2 I: (12)
Indeed, by assumption A4 there is a positive probability that the private
belief of both players at stage 1 is strictly higher than p0. Since the cut-oﬀs




Since ¿i( ) and ¿j( ) are independent given Θ, Eq. (12) implies that
PH(min(¿i( );¿j( )) < +1) < 1, and the claim follows, since min(ti;tj) =
min(¿i( );¿j( )).
We conclude with P8 claiming that all players stop in ﬁnite time under
PL . The basic intuition is as follows. First, observe that once one player
drops out, the other faces a one-player problem. Since in the one-player
problem the cut-oﬀ sequence is positive and constant, while if the type is L
the private belief converges to 0 with probability 1, this player will drop out
in ﬁnite time.
Now, if both players continue forever with positive probability when the
type is L, then by P7 they also do so when the type is H, so that there
is a stage such that if both players stayed in until that stage, they would
continue forever with high probability. Therefore, from that stage on each
of the players essentially faces a one-player problem, so that her cut-oﬀs are
positive and roughly constant. Since in the one-player problem the cut-oﬀ
39sequence is positive and constant, while if the type is L the private belief
converges to 0 with probability 1, at some point the private belief will fall
below the cut-oﬀ, and one of the players will drop out.
We elaborate on these two steps in the next two lemmas.
Lemma 6.6 One has PL(minf¿i( );¿j( )g = +1) = 0.
Proof. If PL(¿i( ) = +1) = 0, the result is proven. Assume now that
PL(¿i( ) = +1) > 0, so that the ratio
PH(¿i( ) ¸ n)
PL(¿i( ) ¸ n)
has a positive ﬁnite
limit, when n goes to +1. Since limn!+1 pj
n = 0, PL-a.s., it follows by
Lemma 4.8, that limn!+1 qj
n = 0, PL-a.s. Hence, by Corollary 6.3, one has
¿j( ) < +1 PL-a.s., and the result follows.
Lemma 6.7 One has PL(maxfti;tjg = +1) = 0.
Proof. It is enough to prove that ti < +1, PL-a.s. The same proof
will apply to player j as well. Observe ﬁrst that by Lemma 6.6 one has
ti < +1 whenever ti · tj. Let k 2 N be an arbitrary stage. On the event




n(k) are the cut-oﬀs associated with the plan Ái.
By P2 the sequence (¼i
n(k))n is constant, and since limn!+1 pi
n = 0, PL-a.s.
and positive, it follows that ti < +1 on the event f¿j( ) = k < ¿i( )g. The
result follows.
6.6 Proof of P6
We proceed with the proof of P6. Let Á be a symmetric equilibrium, with
cut-oﬀs (¼i
n), and let a stage n 2 N be given. Whenever pi
n = ¼i
n( ) and tj
n =
, player i is indiﬀerent between dropping out or not. Hence, by Corollary
6.3, her posterior belief satisﬁes p¤ · qi
n · ¯ p. Since tj
n = , private and











PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)







PH(¿j( ) ¸ n)
PL(¿j( ) ¸ n)
:
Since the function x
1¡x is increasing, and since p¤ · qi











PL(¿j( ) ¸ n)
·
¯ p












By P2 the sequence (¼i
n( ))n2N is decreasing, so that from (13) we obtain
¼
i
n( ) ¸ c1PL(¿
j( ) ¸ n):
Since ¼i




(1 ¡ ¯ p)PH(¿j( ) = +1)
:
By P8 we have
PH(¿
j( ) ¸ n) ¸ PH(¿
j( ) = +1) > 0;
so that from (13) we obtain
¼
i
n( ) · c2PL(¿
j( ) ¸ n):
The proof is complete since in a symmetric equilibrium ¿i = ¿j.
7 Large games
This section is devoted to the analysis of large games. We here provide a
detailed intuition for the proof of the ﬁrst statement in Theorem 2.7. The
proof itself is given in appendix C. Given any N 2 N, we consider the N-
player game with player set f1;:::;Ng. For any N 2 N we ﬁx an equilibrium
(ÁN;i)i=1;¢¢¢;N be given, with cut-oﬀs (¼N;i
n (~ ®N)), where ~ ®N are the (N ¡ 1)-
dimensional status vectors.
We ﬁrst focus on stage 1. Since no public information is available at that
stage, the relevant cut-oﬀs are abbreviated to ¼
N;i
1 . Let ½N
µ be the expected
proportion of players who drop out in stage 1 when the common type is µ.
By taking a subsequence, we may assume that (½N
L) and (½N
H) converge to
some constants ½L and ½H respectively. Using Proposition 4.4 we will prove
that ½L > ½H: when the common type is L more players drop out at stage 1
than when it is H. By (some version of) the law of large numbers, the actual
number of players who drop out at stage 1 converges to ½µ, as N goes to
inﬁnity. As a consequence, all players know that at stage 2 they will (almost
41perfectly) discriminate between the two types H and L, on the basis of the
proportion of players who drop out in stage 1. Let us adopt the viewpoint of
some player i in stage 1, and consider the continuation strategy, according to
which (i) player i will continue forever if this proportion is close to ½H, (ii)
will exit in stage 2 if it is close to ½L, and (iii) play in some arbitrary way
otherwise. This strategy yields a payoﬀ close to EH[Xi
0]=(1 ¡ ±) if Θ = H,
and close to EL[Xi
0] if Θ = L.
Observe now that in stage 1, player i’s posterior belief on Θ coincides
with her private belief pi
1. As a consequence, player i’s OCP in stage 1 is
close to pi
1EH[Xi
0]=(1 ¡ ±) + (1 ¡ pi
1)EL[Xi
0]. Hence, the cut-oﬀ ¼
N;i
1 used by
player i in the equilibrium, must converge to p¤ (which is deﬁned in Eq. (2)),
and the ﬁrst assertion follows.
8 Concluding remarks
8.1 The ﬁnite-stage game
The game we have studied lasts for inﬁnitely many stages. Some of our
results hold for ﬁnite-stage games as well.
The three-stage example we have studied provides two observations.
² Whereas in the one-player problem, the ﬁxed cut-oﬀ is independent
of the initial belief, in the example the cut-oﬀs depend on the initial
belief.
² There are multiple equilibria in the ﬁnite-stage game.
8.2 Conditions for the existence of an equilibrium
Some of our results hold in a much more general framework. Assume that
the payoﬀs (Xi
n)n2N are arbitrary random variables deﬁned over a probability
space (Ω;P). Assume that the inﬂow of private information is described by
arbitrary ﬁltrations (Fi
n)n2N over Ω, for i 2 I. Let a timing game proceed as
in Section 1.1 (each player i receives her private information, and observes
in addition all past decisions). Then, provided supn2N jXi
nj is P-integrable,
the timing game has an equilibrium, not necessarily in pure strategies.15
15The existence proof for this framework diﬀers from the one given here.
42This more general framework allows for (i) asymmetric games, (ii) non-
exchangeable payoﬀs, and (iii) games in which the acquisition of private
information is disentangled from one’s own payoﬀs.
Plainly, the existence of a symmetric equilibrium requires a symmetric
framework. Since the information structure is general, the posterior belief is
not necessarily a suﬃcient statistic, and the payoﬀ need not be monotonic in
the private belief, so that a cut-oﬀ equilibrium need not exist.
8.3 Variations of the model
Our model is speciﬁc in many aspects, and there are many interesting vari-
ations that are worth studying.
In some cases (e.g., ﬁnancial markets), players can strategically decide
whether to reveal the private information they have learned.
In other cases, at every given stage players can either acquire new in-
formation, or learn the status of the other players, but they cannot learn
both types of information simultaneously. The decision which information
to learn, though, is strategic. Such cases occur, e.g., among animals looking
for a patch of berries, who can either taste the berries or look at their fellow
birds, but cannot do both activities at the same time (see, e.g., Valone and
Templeton (2002) and Giraldeau et al. (2002), for additional variations that
arise from animal behavior).
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Appendix
For the reader’s convenience, the organization of the appendix mirrors the
organization of the main text.
A Beliefs
A.1 The private belief
We start with the proof of Lemma 4.3.
45Proof of Lemma 4.3. We need to prove that FH(p) · FL(p), for each
p 2 [0;1]. By equality (3), one has pi




0) · r, with
r :=
p(1¡p0)




















o fL(x)dx · rFL(p) · FL(p): (14)
For r > 1 we adapt the previous computation. For e p 2 (p;1], we set e r :=
e p(1 ¡ p0)
(1 ¡ e p)p0
> r, so that pi





e r. Exchanging the roles of
the two states in the computation, we obtain
PL(pi





Letting e p ! p and using the right-continuity of FH and FL, we get
PL(pi







1 · p) · PL(pi
1 · p) = FL(p):
This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.3.
We now proceed with the extensions of Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.4. Under the assumption that FL(p) < 1 and
FH(p) > 0, the computation in the above proof of Lemma 4.3 delivers FH(p) <
FL(p) unless r = 1. Therefore, we may assume w.l.o.g. that r = 1, which corre-
sponds to p = p0.
Since E[pi
1] = p0 and since pi
1 has a density, one has P(pi
1 < p0) > 0. Hence,
there is e p < p0 with FH(e p) > 0. Set now e r =
e p(1¡p)
p(1¡e p). Following the steps of the
the proof of Lemma 4.3,
PH(pi





o fL(x)dx · PL(pi
1 2 (e p;p]):
On the other hand, since e r < r one has FH(e p) < FL(e p). Therefore,
FH(p) = FH(e p) + PH(pi
1 2 (e p;p]) < FL(e p) + PL(pi
1 2 (e p;p]) = FL(p):
46this concludes the proof of Proposition 4.4.
We conclude with the proof of Proposition 4.5. It makes use of the following
lemma.
Lemma A.1 Let K 2 N be given, and let X1;:::;XK and Y1;:::;YK be two
collections of independent real-valued variables, with continuous c.d.f.’s. Assume
that Xk stochastically dominates Yk, for each k = 1;:::;K. For each k, set e Xk =
X1 +¢¢¢+Xk and e Yk = Y1 +¢¢¢+Yk. Then the vector ( e Xk)k=1;:::;K stochastically
dominates the vector (e Yk)k=1;:::;K. Moreover, one has P(e Y1 > y1;:::; e YK > yK) ·
P( e X1 > y1;:::; e XK > yK), for each y1;:::;yK 2 R.
Proof. For each k, we deﬁne a measurable and non-decreasing function gk :
R ! R by
gk(x) = inffz : FYk(z) ¸ FXk(x)g:
Observe that Yk and gk(Xk) have the same law. Since Xk dominates Yk, one has
gk(x) · x, for each x 2 R. The conclusions follow easily.



























By Lemma 4.3, the law of Zi
n under PH stochastically dominates the law of Zi
n










under PH dominates the law of the same vector under PL. The result follows
since the map x 7! ln x
1¡x is an increasing bijection.
A.2 Markov properties of the beliefs
We here prove Proposition 4.14 relative to Markov chains. We will use the following
technical observation.
Lemma A.2 Let H1 and H2 be two independent ¾-algebras on a probability space
(Ω;P) and, for i = 1;2, let Ai be a sub-¾-ﬁeld of Hi. For each C1 2 H1 and each
C2 2 H2, one has
P
¡
C1 \ C2 j ¾(A1;A2)
¢
= P(C1 j A1) £ P(C2 j A2):











holds. It is suﬃcient to prove the equality for




























= P(C1 \ C2)P(C2)
where the ﬁrst equality follows by independence, and the other two from basic
properties of conditional expectations.
We prove all three statements in Proposition 4.14 in turn. We start with the
second one, since it is used in the proof of the other two.
Lemma A.3 The sequence (pi
n)n2N is a Markov chain for (Fi
n)n2N, both under
P and under Pµ.
Proof. We prove the claim for P. Let a stage n 2 N be given. The belief
pi






n). Therefore, by Dynkin’s lemma,






























n are conditionally independent given Θ, and since pi
n is Fi
n-











and the result follows.
We proceed with the third statement.
Lemma A.4 Under Pµ, both sequences (pi
n) and (t
j
n) are Markov chains for the
ﬁltration (Gi
n).




n+1 2 B j Gi
n) = Pµ(pi
n+1 2 B j Fi
n) = Pµ(pi
n+1 2 B j pi
n);
where the ﬁrst equality follows by Lemma A.2 and the second one by Lemma A.3.
Therefore, the sequence (pi
n) is a Markov chain for (Gi
n).




that. Therefore for k < n, both Pµ(t
j
n+1 = k j Gi
n) and Pµ(t
j





n = k, and zero otherwise: hence Pµ(t
j
n+1 = k j Gi
n) = Pµ(t
j
n+1 = k j t
j
n). For
each of the two remaining values ® = ;n of t
j
n+1, one has, by Lemma A.2,
Pµ(t
j
n+1 = ® j Gi
n) = Pµ(t
j
n+1 = ® j tj
n);
and the result follows.





P(Θ = µ j Gi
n) £ Pµ(G j Gi
n); (16)
that holds for each G 2 Gi
n+1. For G 2 Fi




n) + (1 ¡ qi
n)PL(G j Fi
n):
Lemma A.5 Under P, the sequence (pi
n;t
j
n)n2N is a Markov chain for (Gi
n)n2N.
Proof. Let a stage n 2 N be given. By Theorem 9.6 in Doob (1953), it is








n+1 = ® j pi
n;t
j
n). Let such an












n+1 = ® j Gi
n):
(17)




n+1 = ® j Gi
n) = Pµ(pi
n+1 2 B j Fi
n) £ Pµ(t
j
n+1 = ® j tj
n)
= Pµ(pi
n+1 2 B j pi
n) £ Pµ(t
j
n+1 = ® j tj
n):
On the other hand, P(Θ = H j Gi
n) = qi
n is only a function of pi
n and of t
j
n,
hence P(Θ = H j Gi
n) = P(Θ = H j pi
n;t
j









P(Θ = µ j pi
n;tj
n) £ Pµ(pi
n+1 2 B j pi
n) £ Pµ(t
j





n+1 = ® j pi
n;tj
n):
this concludes the proof of the lemma.
49B The optimal stopping problem
B.1 About the deﬁnition






n2N. Let a plan Áj be given. Given a plan (¿i(®);® 2 N [ f g),
deﬁne a stopping time ¾i by: ¾i = ¿i(t
j
n). Conversely, let ¾i be a stopping time
for (Gi









































The next two lemmas imply that the expected payoﬀ E[Y i
¾] is always well-






Lemma B.1 The sequence (Y i
n)n2N converges P-a.s.
Proof. Since P =
P
µ P(Θ = µ)Pµ, it is suﬃcient to prove that (Y i
n) converges
Pµ-a.s., for each µ. Under Pµ, the variables (Xi
n)n2N are independent, with the











n converges P-a.s., as desired.
Lemma B.2 The variable supn2N jY i
nj is P-integrable.





< +1, for each µ. For
n 2 N, deﬁne e Xi
n := Xi
n ¡ Eµ[Xi
n]: Under Pµ, the variables ( e Xi
n) are centered





k of partial sums is a
martingale under Pµ, with Eµ[e Y i
n] = 0. Observe that
Y i






so that supn2N jY i
nj · supn2N je Y i
nj + Eµ[Xi
0]=(1 ¡ ±).











0); for each n 2 N:










c2; for each c > 0 and k 2 N:





















B.2 The Snell envelope
The quantity V i
n := Y i
n + ±n max(0;Wi
n) = ess sup¾2ΛnE[Y i
¾ j Gi
n] is the optimal
payoﬀ of player i when she must stay in for at least n stages. It is called the Snell
envelope of the sequence (Y i
n).
It satisﬁes the following dynamic programming principle (see Chow and Rob-
bins (1963), or Ferguson (2004, ch. 3) for a proof).





















n)n2N is the least supermartingale that majorizes (Y i
n)n2N.
Indeed, the optimal continuation payoﬀ is the maximum between dropping out
at stage n + 1 and the optimal continuation payoﬀ if the player stays in at stage
n + 1.
Lemma 5.2 follows from Lemma B.4.
Lemma B.4 For each stage n 2 N, there is a measurable map vi
n such that
V i






Proof. We obtain vi
n as the limit of the sequence (ºk
n)k2N, which is deﬁned
inductively as follows. We set º0
n = 0, for each n 2 N. Given an index k 2 N and




















n)n is a Markov chain for (Gi
n)n under P, the maximum on the right-
hand side is indeed a function of (pi
n;t
j
n). For every ﬁxed n we have º0
n = 0 · º1
n,
51and therefore by induction the sequence (ºk
n)k is non-decreasing. In particular,
vi
n := limk!+1 ºk
n exists.





n))n is the Snell envelope of (Y i
n)n. By



































n) ¸ V i
n, P-a.s. for each stage n 2 N.
Conversely, we ﬁrst argue by induction that
V i





P-a.s. for each stage n and k. Indeed, since º0
n = 0, and since V i
n ¸ Y i
n (19) holds
for k = 0 and every n 2 N. Since V i
n = maxfY i
n;E[V i
n+1 j Gi
n]g, and using (19)
with n + 1, this yields V i















for each n 2 N, so that (19) holds for k + 1.
Finally, letting k ! +1 yields V i





n). this concludes the proof.
B.3 An explicit form for wi
n












n. It relates to the explicit version of qi




























n) = P(Θ = H j Gi






















In words, if active in stage n+k, which occurs when ¾¤
n+1 > n+k, player i receives
the payoﬀ Eµ[Xi
0] in that stage, which is discounted back to stage n.
52Formally, let k 2 N be given. Observe that the event ¾¤
n+1 > n + k is Gi
n+k-
measurable, while Xi
n+k is independent of Gi




























The equality (21) follows by summation over k 2 N.








By deﬁnition of ¾¤
n+1, one has f¾¤











Let l = 1;¢¢¢ ;k be given. By (3), the private belief pi
n+l in stage n + l is related























Therefore, the indicator function of the set f¾¤
n+1 > n+kg also coincides with
a function of (pi
n;Xi
n;¢¢¢ ;Xi
n+l¡1), which we denote "k.











conditionally independent given Gi
n.
Consequently, the conditional probability Pµ
¡
¾¤




























n) is a Markov chain for (Gi
n) under Pµ, since pi
n is Gi
n-measurable, and
since ~ Xi is independent of Gi



























n+1 > n + k j Gi
n
¢

































n P-a.s., as desired.
B.4 Regularity properties of the Snell envelope
We prove here Lemmas 5.3. The proof makes use of the following technical lemma.
Lemma B.5 Let º be a probability measure over R, absolutely continuous w.r.t. the
Lebesgue measure, and let B µ R be a Borel set. Then the map x 2 R 7! º(x+B)
is continuous.
Proof. Let a sequence (xn)n2N be given, converging to some x 2 R. Set
Bx = B + x, and, for n 2 N, deﬁne a measure ºn by ºn(C) = º(C + xn ¡ x). The
sequence (ºn)n converges weakly to º. Since º is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the
Lebesgue measure, one has º(@Bx) = 0, where @Bx is the topological boundary of
Bx. Therefore, by Theorem 25.8 in Billingsley (1995), one has limn!+1 ºn(Bx) =
º(Bx), and the result follows.
Lemma B.6 For every ﬁxed status variable ® 2 N [ f g, the function p 7!
wi
n(p;®) is continuous in [0;1].
Proof. Let a stage n 2 N, and k 2 N be given. Fix a vector ~ ® = (®n+1;:::;®n+k),









is continuous in p, for each choice of k 2 N.
















We will prove that the inner integral is continuous in p, for each choice of (x2;:::;xk).
Once this claim is established, the continuity property follows by the dominated
convergence theorem, applied to the integral over Rk¡1 in (B.4).
Thus, let (x2;:::;xk) be given. We will describe the set of values (p;x) such
that "k(p;x;~ x¡1;x;~ ®) = 1. In eﬀect, ﬁxing the payoﬀs x2;:::;xk to player 1 in
stages n through n + k ¡ 2, and the status ~ ® of player j in stages n + 1 through
n + k, this amounts to characterizing the values of pi
n and Xi
n for which player i
will still be active in stage n + k (included).
54By deﬁnition, "k(p;x;~ x¡1;~ ®) is equal to one if and only if, for each l = 1;:::;k,
one has gi
n+l(pi
n+l;®n+l) > 0, where pi
n+l is the private belief in stage n + l, as
computed from pi
n = p and the payoﬀs x;x2;:::;xl¡1 received in stages n;n +
1;:::;n + l ¡ 1




















In the light of (25), the condition gi
n+l(pi








for some Borel set Fl in R.
Deﬁne now F :=
k \
l=1
Fl. According to the above discussion,
Z
R



































0). By assumption A4,
º is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. Therefore, the continuity
claim follows from Lemma B.5.
Lemma B.7 For every ﬁxed status variable ® 2 N [ f g, the function p 7!
wi
n(p;®) is increasing.










Let p 2 [0;1] be given. We deﬁne a stopping time ¾ by
¾ = inf
n









55Note that ¾ stops when player i would have stopped for the same payoﬀs from
stage n to stage n + k ¡ 1 and if her belief at stage n was p. When pi

























n inﬂuences E[Y i
n!¾ j Gi
n] only through qi
n.
By Lemma 4.9, qi
n > Qi
n(p;®), if pi
n > p and t
j




0 > EL[Y i
n!¾ j t
j
n], the quantity E[Y i
n!¾ j Gi
n] (which depends on p) increases with
p. The result follows by (7).
As a consequence, given ®, there is a unique p 2 (0;1) such that wi
n(p;®) = 0.
We denote it by ¼i
n(®).
B.5 Uniqueness of the best reply
We now show that ¾¤ is the unique solution to P, thereby establishing Corollary
5.5. The intuition is simple. At stage n, player i is indiﬀerent between dropping or
not if Wi




n). Since the law of pi
n has a density, and since
t
j
n takes at most ﬁnitely many values, this occurs with probability zero. Thus,
there is a zero probability that player i will ever be indiﬀerent between the two
alternatives.
Proposition B.8 Let ¾ be an optimal stopping time for P. One has ¾ = ¾¤,
P-a.s.
Proof. Let ¾ be an optimal stopping time. In the light of Lemma 5.1, we
already know that ¾ ¸ ¾¤, P-a.s.
We argue by contradiction, and assume that, for some stage n 2 N, and some ®,
one has P(¾¤ = n < ¾;t
j








If f¾¤ = n < ¾;t
j








n=®] < 0. Summing over n and ® yields E[Y i
¾¤!¾1¾¤<¾] < 0. One
obtains
E[Y i
¾] = E[Y i
¾¤ + Y i
¾¤!¾] < E[Y i
¾¤];
a contradiction. This concludes the proof.
56C Large games
Given N 2 N, we consider a version of the game with player set IN = f1;:::;Ng.





n ) is an N ¡ 1-dimensional vector ~ ®N¡1. Since all players are
active at stage 0, only the cut-oﬀ ¼
N;i




Adopting the notations of Section 5, we denote by w
N;i
1 (p) the OCP of player i
in the N-player game, when she reaches stage 1 with a private belief equal to p.16
The function w
N;i
1 is increasing and continuous, and ¼
N;i
1 = inffp: w
N;i
1 (p) ¸ 0g.
We prove Proposition C.1, which readily implies the ﬁrst statement in Theorem
2.7.


















Proof. We start with some preparation, and set o(p) := p
EH[Xi
0]
1¡± + (1 ¡
p)EL[Xi
0]. By Lemma B.7 all functions w
N;i
1 (N 2 N;i 2 IN) are increasing.








1 (p) ¡ o(p)
¯ ¯
¯ = 0:
We will prove the stronger claim that for any sequence (iN)N2N of players such
that iN 2 f1;:::;Ng one has limN!+1
¯ ¯ ¯w
N;iN
1 (p) ¡ o(p)
¯ ¯ ¯ = 0. We therefore let
such a sequence be given. For notational ease, it is convenient to relabel players






1 (p) ¡ o(p)
¯ ¯
¯ = 0: (27)
Each N-player game involves a probability space (ΩN;PN) that is rich enough
to accommodate payoﬀ sequences and randomizing devices for all players. It is
convenient to proceed under the assumption that all these probability spaces coin-
cide. This is w.l.o.g., since one may always embed the sequence (ΩN;PN) into the
product space (£N2NΩN;­N2NPN). More constructively, we may take (Ω;P) to
be rich enough to support countably many sequences of payoﬀs and randomizing
devices with the required properties.
16under the constraint that she remains active in stage 1.
57The proof is organized along the lines of the sketch provided in Section 7.
We ﬁrst prove that the (random) proportion of players who drop out in stage 1
converge P-a.s. to some constant ½µ as the number of players increases to inﬁnity,
with ½L > ½H.
For each N ¸ 2, we denote by ¹N the empirical distribution of the cut-oﬀs
¼
N;i
1 , i > 1, used by player 1’s opponents in stage 1. That is, ¹N is the atomic
distribution on [0;1] deﬁned by ¹N(fxg) = 1
N¡1jfi > 1 : ¼
N;i
1 = xgj. By Corollary
6.4, ¹N assigns probability one to the interval [p¤;p0]. Since the set of probability
distributions on [0;1], endowed with the topology of weak convergence, is compact
and metric, there is a subsequence of (¹N)N2N that converges weakly, say to
¹. We will prove that (27) holds along this subsequence. Since the converging
subsequence is arbitrary, the result also holds along the original sequence. We
relabel the subsequence as (¹N)N2N.
For µ = L;H, we set ½µ =
R
[0;1] Fµ(x)d¹(x), where Fµ is the c.d.f. of pi
1 under
Pµ. Observe that Fµ does not depend on i. Thus, ½µ is the limit probability (as
the number N of players increases) that a randomly selected player will drop out
at stage 1. Lemma C.2 below substantiates this interpretation.
Given a number N 2 N of players, we denote by !N the (random) proportion










Lemma C.2 For µ = L;H, one has limN!+1 !N = ½µ, Pµ-a.s.
Proof. Fix µ, set TN;i := 1fpi
1·¼
N;i
1 g ¡ Fµ(¼
N;i







For each N, the variables TN;i (i > 1) are centered, independent, and bounded by
1. From Chebyshev’s inequality it follows that (e !N)N¸2 converges Pµ-a.s. to zero
(see Cantelli’s proof of the strong law of large numbers, Shiryaev, 1984, p.388),
and the result follows.
Lemma C.3 One has ½L > ½H.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that Fµ(x) 2 (0;1) whenever x 2 [p¤;p0]. By assumption
A4, inf C = 0, where C is the support of p1























constant, this implies FH(p0) < 1, and FL(p0) < 1 as well. Therefore Fµ(x) 2 (0;1)
for each x 2 [p¤;p0].
58By Proposition 4.4 this yields FH(x) < FL(x) for each x 2 [p¤;p0]. Since ¹ is





We now conclude by providing a lower bound for the OCP. For each N 2 N,
deﬁne a stopping time ¾N by ¾N = 2 if !N ¸ (½L + ½H)=2, and ¾N = +1
otherwise. According to ¾N, if the proportion of the number of players who stay
in at stage 1 is closer to ½H, player 1 stays in forever, whereas if it is closer to ½L,
she drops out at stage 2.
By Lemma C.2 the proportion of the number of players who stay in at stage 1
reveals the common type, so that limN!+1 ¾N = +1 PH-a.s., and limN!+1 ¾N =




1¡± , while limN!+1 EL[Y 1
1!¾N] = EL[Xi
0]. Consider now the conditional con-
tinuation payoﬀ given G1
1. By the choice of ¾N, the continuation payoﬀ Y 1
1!¾N
is conditionally independent of G1
1, given µ, hence Eµ[Y 1
1!¾N j G1







































1 (p) ¸ o(p):
We proceed to the limit behavior in stage 2. We ﬁrst set up some notation.
Recall that ½µ is the (limit) probability that an arbitrary player will stop in stage








We will prove Proposition C.4 below, which concludes the proof of Theorem 2.7.
Proposition C.4 For N 2 N, let ~ kN = (kN
j )1<j·N 2 f ;1gN¡1 be a N ¡ 1-









has a limit ½ 2 [0;1].
If ½ < ½¤, then limN!1 ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) = 0.
If ½ > ½¤, then limN!1 ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) = 1.
59Lemma 4.8 generalizes to N-player games in an obvious way and the relation


































in the event D where the set of players who actually dropped out in stage 1
coincides with
n








N the two products that appear on the right-hand




N converges either to +1
or to 0, depending on whether ½ < ½¤ or ½ > ½¤.






N + lnΠN) = ½ln
½H
½L











1 ) ¡ ½µ





















¯ ¯ = 0; and
the result follows, since limN!+1 ½N = ½.













N ¸ ¸. By the choice of N and
¸, and from (28), it follows that q
N;1
2 ¸ p0 on the event fp1
2 ¸ "g\D. By Corollary
6.3, this implies ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) · ". Since " is arbitrary, one gets limN ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) = 0,
as desired.




N = 0 by Lemma C.5. Let








N · ¸. As above, one has q
N;1
2 · p¤ on the event
fp1
2 · ag \ D. By Corollary 6.3, this implies ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) ¸ a. Since a is arbitrary,
one gets limN!+1 ¼
N;1
2 (~ kN) = 1, as desired.
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